Without various collaborators, I have studied asymmetric information information problems in insurance markets. One distinguishing feature of our work is that we use idiosyncratic (contract-specific) variation in incentives to avoid claims over time to empirically assess the importance of moral hazard effects. This allows for more robust inference on such effects than empirical methods that use cross-sectional (between-contracts) variation in incentives.  

Car insurance

With Pierre-André Chiappori, James Heckman, Jean Pinquet, and Tibor Zavadil, I have analyzed asymmetric information in car insurance using longitudinal contract-level data from insurers.


Unemployment insurance

With Gerard van den Berg and Jan van Ours, I have measured the importance of moral hazard in unemployment insurance. We exploit that punitive benefits reductions (sanctions) induce individual-specific variation in incentives to find employment over time.


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